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I. Introduction
A. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to describe contemporary developments in genetics which have raised a variety of ethical problems. To
do this, I will describe several of these developments , raise some of the
thematic ethical issues to which they point, and describe some of the
responses that have been made to them. I will look at two broad problem areas: the applicaton of specific knowledge in genetics and the
implications of gaining such knowledge. My intent in discussing the
ethical dimension of these problems is to provide an overview of the
debates which are occurring with respect to these problem areas. Thus,
I am more interested in presenting the contours of the debate rather
than argue specific points, although that will also occur. It is also
important to note that several of the problems I discuss are linked
together. I will separate several of these primarily for purposes of discussion and analysis.
B.

Definitions

Genetics is the division of the life sciences which focuses exclusively
on the genes or the units that determine one's inheritance. Occasionally in bioethical discussions, genetics is used as a shorthand way of
referring to many of the disciplines and developments within the life
sciences. Although I will occasionally use the word in this broad sense,
I will primarily use it in the technical sense of the study of the genes
and the application of that knowledge in a variety of settings. The
genes are the basic blueprint or plan for heredity, the program wh ich
helps specify how an organism will develop. The genes are made up of
segments of DNA, deoxyribonucleic acid, in which four chemical
subunits are united in a variety of ways. These four chemicals,
abbreviated as A, G, C, T, are the alphabet which carries to the cell the
instructions for making proteins. Within recent years, geneticists have
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learned more and more about the composition of this alphabet, the
processes by which t he message is originally written and communicated, and the ways in which the messages can be read. Such growing
understanding of t he genetic code has occasioned many discussions of
t he problem of both application and implication which find their way
into this paper.
The te rm genetic engineering has a similar narrow and broad meaning. Strictly speaking, it refers to technical interventions into the
structure of a gene for a variety of purposes including, but not limited
to, removing a deleterious gene, changing the genetic structure of a
particular organism, or enh ancing a particular genetic capacity .
Genetic engineering is an intervention into the actual genetic structure
itself. In a broader sense, and in the sense most often used, genetic
engineering refers to the possibility of designing not only our descendants, but also of manipulating t he entire ecosystem in specific directions. More specifically, though, genetic engineering in the broad sense
refers to technologies such as in vitro fertilization, cloning, recombinant DNA research, and a variety of other applications of the
knowledge of genetics that has a social or policy dimension.
II.
A.

Problems of Application
The Technologies

Recombinant DNA researc h is basically a technique by which a segment of DNA can be removed from its original strand and joined to
another segment of DNA from a different organism, thus forming t h e
recombinant molecule. The new DNA that is placed into t h e host
begins to replicate itself t here. Thus, for example, a molecule can be
made to produce insulin, a new species or o rganism could be devised,
or a new pathogenetic agent could be made for use in insect control or
biological-chemical warfare.
Amniocentesis is a techniqu e in which fetal cells are withdrawn
from the amniotic fluid in the uterus by means of a needle in serted
t hro ugh the pregnant wo man's abdomen. These fetal cells are then
cu ltured, and the chrom oso m es are screen ed to determine whether or
not the developing embryo has a genetic anomaly. Several hundred
genetic diseases can be diagnosed in utero, 1 plus the sex of the fetus
and, given reasonable standards of quality contro l in t he laboratory,
amniocentesis is a highly reliable diagnostic tec hnique.
In vitro fert ilization and embryo tran splant, or external human fertilization , received a great deal of attention last year when the first
baby conceived , transplanted, and delivered by such a process was
born in England. This technology involves the removal of an egg from
t he ovary, external fertilization, and then implantation into a prepared
uterus. While a fairly straightforward procedure, t he success of t his
technique involves the interlocking of a variety of developments in an
understanding of t he h ormonal processes t hat contro l t h e female
Nove mber, 1980
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reproductive cycle, the development of a proper culture in which to
have the fertilization occur, as well as the development of safe and
reliable techniques for the removal of the egg and the transfer of the
blastocyte.

B.

Ethical Issues
1.
Science and Society

One issue is how science is perceived. Two important viewpoints are
provided by contemporary commentators. Pope John Paul II, in his
first encyclical letter, R edemptor Hominis,2 suggested that humans
are becoming afraid of what they produce because of the perception
that these products could radically turn against themselves. He
emphasizes the growing fear that our products can become the means
and instruments for self-destruction. Pope John Paul then asks why it
is that this power has turned against humans and produced a state of
disquiet, fear, and menace. Part of the answer he suggests comes from
a shift in persons perceiving themselves not as masters or guardians of
the world, but as its exploiters and destroyers. Coupled with this is the
issue of determining whether or not those things which are produced
make life more human and, therefore, more worthy of persons.
Another perspective is presented by Daniel Callahan,3 who suggests
that current developments in genetic engineering, broadly speaking,
indicate that ho.th the scientific community and the general public are
more prepared than ever to go ahead with new developments. Callahan
indicates that there has been a typical reaction of wonder and excitement in both the scientific and public media whenever a major breakthrough has been discovered. He concludes that society continues to
be attracted to scientific progress and technological applications of
new insights into the processes of nature. Such a posture continues,
Callahan suggests, because no generally persuasive argument against
continued research and development in genetics has been developed.
By this he means that there has been no argument that goes beyond
logic to an emotional attractiveness that could impel people to act or
not act. That is, none of the arguments against genetic engineering
have been able to touch any of our cultural, ethical, or religious values
in a way that is relevant to a critical evaluation of genetic engineering.
Because of this, business has continued fairly much as usual and
appears likely to do so for the foreseeable future.
Another pro blem in the relation of science and society is a change
in the way of doing science or in the model of scientific research. 4
Traditionally, the purpose of science and a variety of other related disciplines has been to discover the truth of nature . The scientific quest
was to understand what made things and organisms work. Research
focused on discovering structures and stating general laws. Once this
was done, the primary task of science was finished.
348
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This model is changing, primarily because of discoveries in genetics
as well as the application of a variety of other scientific principles,
especially that of nuclear power. The new perception is that not only
can we know the truths of nature, but we can also change nature. The
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in the early
1950's set in motion a chain of events which has led to the technique
of recombinant DNA. It is now possible, as mentioned previously, to
reconstruct various molecules and to make them perform in new ways.
It is equally possible to build a new species out of previously existing
species and, in this way, directly intervene in the evolutionary process.
In addition to being able to state the basic scientific laws that regulate
the workings of nature, it is also possible to intervene into the very
heart of the genetic code to change the information and produce a
new product.
Such power, of course, raises a variety of issues related to the social
implications of such a shift in model. One of the major areas in impact
will be on the self-understanding of the scientist. Although the caricature of the scientist sitting in the research laboratory unencumbered
by any of the cares of the workaday world is manifestly inaccurate,
nonetheless many scientists direct their primary efforts to basic
research with little worry of potential applications or of long-term
implications of what they were doing. It was assumed that they were
apolitical and primarily providing a service which society would determine how to use.
In the light of the new possibilities within science, however, such a
posture may no longer be adequate. At least, a scientist must reexamine what is the nature of the profession of science and what its
relation to society might be. Callahan has suggested four general
propositions which are helpful in such an initial re-evaluation.
1. Individuals and groups are ord inari ly responsible only for the consequences of those actions that are voluntary and intentional on their p art .
However, they may also be held responsible for the unintended consequences of their actions if, through negligence, they fail to take into
account such consequences.
2. Individuals and groups cannot be held responsible for those actions the
consequences of which are totally unknown . However, if they voluntarily
undertake such acts, they may be h eld responsible for the consequences
unless there were serious reasons for undertaking the action in the first
place. One cannot, without serious reason, just " play around" in the
unknown while simultaneously disclaiming responsibility for the results.
3. When others may be affected by our actions, they ordinarily have a right
to demand that the ir wishes and values be respected . This is particularly
the case when those actions may result in harm to them.
4. Individual scientists and scientific groups are subject to the same norms
of ethical responsibility as those of all other individu als in groups in
society. They have neither more responsibility for their actions nor less ;
there is no special ethic of responsibility applying to scientists that does
not apply to others. 5
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Callahan then supplements these general propositions with two
principles that he derives from the basis of our past experiences. The
first of these is what he calls the historical principle which suggests
that we know, in ways that earlier generations did not, that the search
for knowledge can bring about harmful consequences and that it is
possible to trace back the causal sequence. Because we know this is
possible from past experience, Callahan argues that we should evaluate
more carefully research that can set in motion causal chains, of which
some outcomes might conceivably be harmful. This historical principle
is supplemented with the imagination principle which suggests that a
scientist might well assume that since unintended harmful consequences have happened with other forms of research, he or she might
assume that t he same thing cou ld happen with this particular project.
Therefore, it is incumbent on the scientist to try to project or to
envision possibilities that may arise in the outcomes of the particular
project so that they can be evalu ated personally and socially. Such a
framework, while not totally fail-safe, provides at least a context in
which critical evaluation can occur before a project is started or when it
appears that there may be harmful outcomes of a particular application of knowledge from a project. Third, the past debate over the
safety of recombinant DNA research and the growing debate over the
safety of nuclear power has brought forth a new model of a scientist:
the scientist as advocate . In these debates, we see different scientists
hurling technical as well as personal accusations against one another.
The problem that is revealed is t h e possibility that experts in a field
can and do disagree on both the facts and the interpretation of those
facts. The disagreement, however, allowed scientists to be perceived
by the public and their peers as advocates for a particular position or
cause . Many scientists realized that they were in a new role and were
often uncomfortable with it; they also realized that many of the issues
that they were discussing were socially important enough to justify
such a shift in role. Of course, the model of the scientist as advocate
presents an interesting problem about the relati o nship between facts
and values. Oftentimes the facts may be reasonably clear and
apparent, but the framework for the evaluation of these facts may be
quite different between scientists for a variety of personal and social
reasons. For example, one scientist may have a higher tolerance for
risks than another, and this will color how h e or sh e evaluates a particular problem. Thus, it is important for the scientist , when he or sh e
assu mes the role of advocate, to recognize as clearly as possible the
personal, scientifi c, social, and cultural sources of hi s or her viewpoint
so that t he advocacy can be on as reasonable a basis as possible.
2.

Nature and Ethics

The secon d major area of discussion that is raised by so m e developments in genetics is the relationship between nature and ethics. One of
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the traditional viewpoints in this discussion is to see nature as a type
of limit. Traditional natural law theory is an example of this perspective. In this tradition, one uses the order of nature as the basis upon
which one elucidates moral principles. This is justified because the
order of nature reflects the plan of God for nature which can be discovered and understood by human reason. Because this order of
nature is normative, one can legitimately argue that nature in this perspective is a conservative or limiting principle because it sets up limits
or bounds beyond which one may not go. As an example we can refer
to the traditional argument against the use of artificial contraceptives
which, in simplified form, states that they separate what nature
united - sexual intercourse and procreation. Such a unity, it is argued,
is inherent in the order of nature which reflects divine reason and,
therefore, this structure limits what can be done in this area. Such a
moral tradition tends to be conservative and would approach interventions into nature with caution, if not suspicion.
A second perspective envisions nature as a model. This orientation
uses the natural law perspective mentioned above, to argue that some
occurrences in nature might be replicated. While this model may not
allow any more interventions into nature than the previously discussed
model would, it could expand the kinds of things one could do on the
basis of nature. In this framework, it might be legitimate to replicate
certain instances of pre-moral evils that occur in nature as long as one
has a proportionate reason for so doing. For example, it is the case
that during the first several weeks of the process of conception and
implantation and initial development approximately 70% of zygotes
are lost. A number of these zygotes seem to be naturally aborted
because of structural anomalies, hormonal imbalances within the
uterus, or a variety of other problems connected with the necessity of
many different systems coming together at precisely the right
moment. Would it be legitimate, therefore, to replicate this instance of
embryo loss in a laboratory during the course of efforts to fertilize
human ova in vitro? A great number of research protocols could be
justified in terms of the benefits both to future embryos and fetuses as
well as the possibility of bringing benefits to those women who are
unable to conceive in any other way. In this framework one would be
replicating a natural phenomenon in the laboratory and justifying the
pre-moral evil of embryonic loss on the basis of the benefits to be
achieved by the research or the pregnancy, just as the high number of
embryonic losses is justified in nature by the goods of family and
children.
Such an argument is put forward by Richard McCormick who limits
its application to efforts to achieve a pregnancy. He says: "It is not a
violation of the right to life of the zygote if it is spontaneously lost in
normal sexual relations. Why is it any more so when this loss occurs as
the result of an attempt to achieve pregnancy artificially?" 6 Karl
November, 1980

351

Rahner, basing his orientation on the doubtfulness of the personhood
of the fertilized ovum, suggests that zygotes could be used as subjects
of experimentation. "But it would be conceivable that, given a serious
positive doubt about the human quality of the experimental material,
the reasons in favor of experimenting might carry more weight, considered rationally, than the uncertain rights of a human being whose
very existence is in doubt." 7
This orientation is countered by Leon Kass. But although he takes a
very strong stand against the use of embryos for research, he seems to
allow the possibility of their use in research that leads to a pregnancy.
Parentheticall y , we shou ld note that the natural occurrence of embryo and
fetal loss and wastage does not necessarily or automatically justify all delib·
erate , humanly caused destruction of fetal life. For example, the natural loss
of embryos in early pregnancy cannot in itself be a warrant for deliberately
aborting them or for invasively experimenting on them in vitro any more
than stillbirths could be a justification for newborn infanticide. There are
many things that happen naturally that we ought not to do deliberately . It
is curious how the same peopl e who deny the relevance of nature as a guide
for re·evaluating human interventions into human generation, and who deny
that the term "unnatural" carries any ethical weight, will themselves appeal
to "nature's way" when it suits their purposes. Still, in this present matter,
the closeness to natural procreation - the goal is the same, the embryonic
loss is unavoidable and not d esired, and the amount of loss is similar - leads
me to believe that we do no more intentional or unjustified harm in the one
case than in the other, and practice no disrespect. 8

The third model of nature defines nature as evolving. The first two
models of nature that I presented assume that nature is reasonably
static and that the order that is present will remain . This third model
sees nature as continually evolving. This does not necessarily imply
that there is no stability to nature or no laws of nature that can be
known . It does suggest, however, that such laws anc structures may
not be as normative as the other models would su~gest and that a
much greater degree of intervention may be possiblE . This view, for
example, would see change and/or development as r ormative rather
than exceptional. The working assumption of this mOl el is that things
change, and that they change with respect to broadt r developments
within the ecosystem as a whole.
Within this model the concept of history takes on a significance
lacking in the other two models. History here is seen as L near or teleological, rather than cyclic or episodic. History has a fut re~ and that
future carries history forward. In Christianity, this orifntation contains a dichotomy: the ultimate future transcends pers( ns and their
efforts at self creation, but through their interventions in history and
nature, persons open themselves to this future and help tc: achieve it.
As Rahner says:
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This human self-creation will develop the concrete form of human openness
which leads to the absolute future that comes from God. But it is never
capable by itself of bringing about this absolute future . Christianity, precisely because it is the religion of the absolute future, must simultaneously
send man out to his duties in the World. 9

Future developments are not entirely knowable or predictable. Yet,
on the other hand, we know that we are evolving, and that we have an
increasing capacity to determine various directions of evolution,
induding human evolution. Thus, developments in genetics, as well as
in psychology, psychiatry, and many of the behavioral sciences have
made it possible to intervene in the development of human beings, and
possibly into human nature, in a way never before thought possible.
The previous two models suggested that nature may serve either as a
limit or as a mirror of the kinds of interventions that might be
ethically possible. Nature will not necessarily have such limiting
capacities in an evolutionary model because the past will not necessarily possess qualities necessary to insure survival in the future. The
past is no longer normative, and the future assumes a greater role in
defining efforts at self-creation. Such a possibility leaves us caught
between the attempt to determine how much of our own self-perception and understanding of our nature is tied to our biology and placed
within the ecosystem and history, and the perception that we possess
the powers to change the course of the direction of evolution in
accordance with our desires and preferences. In this model, a variety
of interventions becomes possible and will be justified in terms of survival value, adaptability, and promotion of a model of human nature
that is seen as desirable.

3.

Problems of Knowledge

A third major problem area is that associated with problems of
knowledge. We have all known the pains and anguish that come from
knowing too little, especially about how to cure a particular disease
that is killing an individual. Lack of knowledge often prevents us from
solving a particular problem or developing a variety of strategies to
provide for different contingencies. Limited knowledge has also made
individuals hold on much too securely to that which is known, for fear
that if that is questioned the foundations will be shaken and the universe will collapse. Limited knowledge can lead to a repression of
knowledge, and we all know the terror that comes when the pursuit of
knowledge is repressed.
In our day we have the problem of seemingly too much knowledge.
The information explosion has caused facts and the journals and
books that report these facts to proliferate at a rate which makes it
impossible for a responsible professional to keep track of new developments, even within a very narrowly defined area of knowledge.
November, 1980
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Another problem associated with this information explosion relates to
the qualitative dimension of that information. We are beginning to
ask, and in many ways are being forced to ask, questions to which we
really have neither a good answer nor a sense of how to go about
answering. Our traditional sources of values are being strained to their
limits by our technical capacities that follow from our gains in
knowledge. A variety of disciplines including genetics, psychology,
psychiatry, philosophy, and theology have all coalesced to raise questions about the meaning of the human. Until fairly recently most of us
were reasonably satisfied that we had a workable sense of who we
were and what we were about. New discoveries and insights into the
full range of possible meanings of the human have given us a new
burden in that we are no longer quite sure of who we are or what we
are to be about. The culture in which we live certainly reinforces this
questioning, but perversely casts us further adrift because it provides
no common basis nor set of values which can help provide a foundation on which to begin to construct a new answer to the question of
what is a human being.
In addition to these problems relating to knowledge, a third major
issue is beginning to arise: discussions of the possibility of limiting or
restricting research. Freedom of speech and freedom of thought are,
of course, two of the most cherished values of our American culture
and serve as significant ethical values in many theories of ethics. Any
suggestion that knowledge be restrained faces a most difficult challenge. In fact, the presumption is that any restriction on knowledge or
thought is almost inherently evil. Yet if one keeps in mind the shift in
the model of nature from one of discovering the truth to that of
changing nature, the argument may change somewhat. The knowledge
that is in question here is knowledge of application or knowledge of
implication.
Few people argue that scientists should be restrained in thinking
through a particular problem or speculating on a new theory. The
traditional argument for this position is well stated by Key Dismukes:
A major factor in advancing scientific understanding and correcting error is
the opportunity of critics to challenge prevailing views and, if they can
adduce convincing evidence, to modify an existing consensus. This aspect of
science is more than a convenient and useful tradition. It is essential to the
operation of science as freedom of speech is to the maintenance of
democracy. 10

The critical problem arises, however, when such knowledge is applied
or is translated into action. Here the lines are not so cleanly drawn,
although there is the tradition in American law, for example, of religious freedom's being limited to a freedom to believe whatever one
wants, but not a similar freedom to act upon those beliefs. Some
restrictions on actions are already- in place, such as regulations concerning the participation of human subjects in biomedical and behav354
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ioral research and the regulations concerning the recombinant DNA
technology .
One background issue in this discussion is the value that progress
has within our society.ll In many ways the knowledge explosion is a
direct result of our valuing progress. The unstated or uncritical
assumption is that progress is in and of itself valuable and, therefore,
must be pursued. To achieve this goal, research and development are
necessary and have a high priority. But it is legitimate at least to question the value of progress and its role in our society, even though General Electric may continue to argue that it is our most important
product. If progress is not morally necessary and perhaps optional,
then it may be the case that a lot of what we perceive to be necessary
may be interesting, but superfluous. This is not a direct argument
against the concept and reality of progress itself; it is a suggestion that .
mindless progress with an exponential generation of data may be
inappropriate at this time. This is especially so in the light of diminishing resources, especially money and energy. At a time when the total
budget to be spent on scientific research and development is diminishing, it may be appropriate to target certain areas of research as having
priority because of their social necessity and value. In this light, limitations on research and knowledge could come about, not because of
inherent distrust of the knowledge to be gained or problems with its
application, but rather because of the acceptance of a new system of
social values and priorities. Greater care in the selection of research
projects to fund would of necessity limit knowledge both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Yet, as Daniel Callahan indicates, our society at present values both
basic scientific research and applied scientific research. 12 Because of
this cultural value, he argues that the burden of proof must lie with
those who are opposed to research . He makes two exceptions to this
basic rule. The first would arise in a case where serious potential harm
to the general public can be hypothesized with a degree of probability
greater than O. When that is the case, those who wish to pursue the
research must submit the issue to public discussion and judgment. A
second exception arises when there is a high probability that harm
would result from the basic research which would be of a magnitude
such as to pose serious threats to human welfare. In that instance,
Callahan argues that the research should not go forward at all, even if
it would be supported by the public. Such an orientation, building as
it does on the current cultural status quo, is persuasive in its argument
that the burden of proof rests with those who are opposed to research.
Yet it does allow for the possibility of restricting research when there
is a probability of harm and of prohibiting research when there would
be serious harm to human welfare. Although not foolproof and containing several ambiguities, such a position allows the discussion of
this critical issue within our contemporary social framework.
November, 1980
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In a recent article, David Smith suggests several reasons for restricting freedom of inquiry.I3 The first of these argues that knowledge
may be immoral in its use and, therefore, restricted. This position
would argue that the right to know must be less than absolute because
some knowledge can end up doing more harm than good. While recognizing the problems and limitations with this orientation, Smith thinks
that it is important to think through what consequences the use of
knowledge will have. He also suggests that knowledge that is either
obtained or disseminated in an immoral way should be restricted. Here
he argues that knowledge obtained at the expense of violating a person's integrity or privacy is immoral and such attempts to gain
knowledge by these means should be restricted. He also argues that
knowledge which is disseminated in a way that is destructive of just
cultural institutions or practices is immoral and should be restrained
because it threatens the very fabric and basis of our life together.
Finally, Smith suggests that knowledge which can be destructive of us
as persons should be restricted. Some knowledge could shatter a person's world view, and Smith argues that perhaps that knowledge
should not be communicated to that person. He also suggests that premature communication of scientific theories could be immoral
because they are untimely and, therefore, may also be harmful to a
person's self-understanding. The basis of Smith's argument is his perception that knowledge is social and must be evaluated in a social
context, not in an exclusively individualistic framework . He also
argues that a scholar or scientist has some responsibility for the repercussions of speaking the truth and that therefore they should evaluate
what they are saying, when they are saying it, and why they are saying
it before they actually do say it. Thus, Smith concludes by arguing for
a tradition of self-discipline hesitation rather than censorship or
repression.
III. Problems of Implication
A. The Technologies

One of the major spin-offs of our understanding of genetics has
been the development of programs of genetic screening in which
carriers of a variety of genetic diseases can be identified and information given to them so they can make a more informed reproductive
decision. Such screening programs involve an identification of a target
population and an examination of the chromosomes of the individuals
in that population to determine whether or not they contain deleterious genes or structural or chemical anomalies. Then the information
is given to the individual, and further genetic counseling can be
obtained if desired.
Another area that is of growing importance is genetic engineering in
which a variety of therapies will be initiated by replacing or removing
356
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deleterious genes from an individual so that a disease will not occur or
will be corrected. The technology of recombinant DNA also makes it
possible to envision the development of new species. Future developments offer the possibility of intervening directly into an individual's
genetic structure for reasons of therapy or the achievement of personal or social desires.
Another area of implication in genetics is really not a technology
but an initial formulation of an academic discipline: sociobiology.
This is the systematic study of the biological bases of all forms of
social behavior in all kinds of organisms including humans. This new
discipline is important because of the far-reaching questions it raises
about the sources of various kinds of human behavior, especially
altruism and freedom. The implications of such questioning of these
valued forms of human behavior raise significant questions which need
to be addressed at least in a preliminary fashion in a session such as
this.
B.

Ethical Issues
1.
Definitions of Health

One of the critical, thematic issues that is raised by both genetic
screening programs and by genetic engineering is the question of what
is health and what is disease. Such a discussion is extremely relevant
because definitions of health and disease provide the baseline for a
medical and ethical argument to determine whether or not intervention is appropriate. One can argue, for example, that definitions of
health and disease should be mainly physiological. 14 That is, one
should view health as functional normality which looks to function
according to design, to conformity and goals pursued by the organism,
as well as the working out of the design of the organism. This orientation suggests that each structure or organ of the body has a particular
range of activities and that if there is a deviation from that range,
there is the possibility of a disease, and if that disease becomes disabling, then it becomes an illness. This makes the task of diagnosis
fairly simple.
This perspective is being incorporated into an ethical argument by
Paul Ramsey who proposes a medical indications policy.15 Here
Ramsey argues that a decision to treat or not to treat should be made
on the basis of physiological criteria which indicate whether the intervention will benefit the patient or not. Such an ethical base line rests
on a physiological definition of health and disease, as well as the presumption that such determinations can be made in a primarily valuefree context.
A second orientation argues that definitions of health and disease,
in addition to a physiological dimension, also contain a cultural or
social component. This is especially true in the areas of psychology
November, 1980
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and psychiatry, although it is also relevant to the evaluation of genetic
diseases. For example, it is relatively easy to diagnose a broken arm
and have little, if any, disagreement about the problem; the same is
true about a variety of other illnesses. On the other hand, when one is
attempting to determine whether one is deviant, crazy, or normal, the
task is quite difficult and is open to a variety of interpretations based
on both one's psychiatric theory as well as one's cultural and social
values. While I accept and would argue that there certainly is such a
reality as mental illness, I think it is imperative at the same time to
recognize that there is a high component of both ideological biases
and cultural values which influence how we perceive individuals whose
behavior is seemingly outside the range of what is either accepted as
normal or socially approved.
Such theoretical issues have very practical implications, especially
when dealing with genetic anomalies. For example, it is clear that
Down's syndrome is heritable, although not in a traditional Mendelian
calculus, and that individuals who have the syndrome suffer, among
other things, a diminished capacity for abstract reasoning. There are
physiological criteria by which one can diagnose the disease, and there
are also psychological markers by which one can determine the degree
of retardation. Yet, that is not the end of the story, for intelligence is
highly valued within our society and that fact leads some to place the
diagnosis of this syndrome into a different category. One who has this
particular genetic disease is seen as a different kind of individual. He
or she is one who does not merely have a disease; this individual is also
socially impaired and disvalued.
Others suggest that knowledge of an individual's genetic constitution
may significantly alter how that individual is raised. For example,
several individuals possess the XYY syndrome, which physiologically
is simply the presence of an extra Y chromosome. One of the early
suggestions in the literature about the social effects of this syndrome
was that it was a possible predictor of aggressive or antisocial behavior.
If parents were to learn that their child was affected with this syndrome and that there was the possibility of this syndrome causing
antisocial behavior, could this not significantly alter how the parents
raise the boy? Should the parents perceive this child as healthy or ill,
diseased or well? Regardless of how one answers these questions, we
have here an example of a genetic anomaly that has a clear physiological criterion but an unclear social outcome with respect to its effect
on the child. The way in which this boy will be raised may be in cultural norms to evaluate his state of health.
Another area of impact is the often unclear distinction between one
who is a carrier of a disease and one who is afflicted with the disease.
Being a carrier of a disease does not imply that one has the symptoms
of the disease or is afflicted by the disease in any way. Genetic screening programs discover both those individuals who are carriers of
358
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disease as well as those who are afflicted with it. If the distinction
between such individuals is misunderstood or confused and communicated in this fashion to others such as insurance companies, individuals
who are only carriers of a disease could be prevented from receiving
insurance policies or other health care benefits because it would be
assumed that they were unhealthy. Not only are such individuals
unjustly deprived of health care benefits, but they are unfairly labeled,
and this provides a possible basis for discriminatory treatment.
2.

Perception of Self and One's Descendants

A second problem involves the perception of one's self and one's
descendants. The traditional ethical model in which personal responsibility was exercised in relation to the earth and one's descendants was
that of stewardship. This doctrine takes its point of departure from
the creation narrative in the book of Genesis. As this doctrine was
developed through the centuries, it was assumed that this stewardship
was exercised in relation to the limits inherent in the orders of nature
and society, both of which were presumed to be static and ordained
by God. This model suggested that stewardship demanded both the
maintaining of these limits and conformity to them.
In the light of the influence of the theory of evolution and advances
within the science of genetics, some are suggesting that a more proper
description of human responsibility might be that of co-creator.
Ironically enough, Robert Francoeur locates this perspective in the
same biblical narrative.
But it seems to me also that in our panic we have deliberately avoided one
of the most basic premises of our Judeo·Christian tradition. We have always
said, often without real belief, that we were and are created by God in his
own image and likeness. " Let us make man in our image , after our likeness"
logically means that man is by na ture a Creator or at least a co-creator in a
very real, awesome manner. Not mere collaborator nor administrator, nor
caretaker. By divine command we are Creators. Why, then, should we
be shocked today to learn that we can now or soon will be able to create the
man of the future? Why should we be horrified and denounce the scientist
or physician for daring to "play God"? Is it because we have forgotten the
Semitic (biblical) conception of creation as God's ongoing collaboration
with man? Creation is our God-given role , and our task is the ongoing creation of the yet unfinishe d , still evolving nature of man. 1 6

This orientation, while containing some overtones of a Promethean
presumptuousness, suggests rather that humans now have the ability
to enter into the process of evolution, to shape it, to direct it, and to
redesign different life forms . As Karl Rahner notes:
He no longer simply takes stock of himself, but changes himself; he contents
himself neither with steering by his own history merely the alteration of his
sphere of existence nor with the mere actualization of those possibilities
which have always offered themselves to man in his commerce with his
fellowmen both in peace and in war. The subject is becoming its own most
proper object; man is becoming h is own creator. 17

November, 1980

359

The model of co-creator assumes that nature is dynamic and changing and that the end of the process is open, but related to the absolute
future of humans. The exercise of responsibility in this model comes
about from helping to shape and direct the evolutionary process
according to values and criteria that are perceived to be appropriate in
the light of goals that will promote human and social goods. Given this
new stage of development as well as a new understanding of nature,
the model of co-creator seems at least as appropriate as that of
stewardship, if not more appropriate.
Along with this debate on the model through which responsibility
should be exercised, there is a continuing debate surrounding the
whole understanding of personhood. The discussion centers on both
indicators of humanhood as well as on qualities appropriate for human
beings in the pursuit of their ends and goals . Joseph Fletcher made the
initial contribution to the former debate by suggesting a variety of
indicators of humanhood including criteria such as minimal intelligence, self-awareness, self-control, a sense of time in the past and
future, a capacity to relate to others, concern for others, communication, control of one 's own existence, curiosity, changeability, a
balance between rationality and feeling, idiosyncracity, and neocortical function . 18 In a later article, Fletcher singled out neocortical
function as the essential trait, the key to humanhood.19 This is
because of the role of the neocortex in providing the biological sine
qua non of all human activities. There were a variety of responses to
Fletcher's original criteria which were more or less happy with them,
depending on one's starting point. Nonetheless, in spite of the somewhat cavalier attitude with which they were proposed, Fletcher did
provide a service by pointing to several problematic areas in defining a
human being and stimulating debate on these problems. Even so,
widely accepted criteria of indicators of humanhood would not necessarily provide the total basis on which a determination of the value of
a human being would rest.
Another contribution towards the understanding of personhood,
provided by Alasdair MacIntyre, 20 looks to desirable qualities rather
than substantive criteria. MacIntyre establishes his criteria not by
setting minimal standards by which one would be judged to be a person or not, but by arguing for qualities that would be desirable in
designing one's descendants. These include an ability to live with
uncertainty, an understanding of one's past which provides a sense of
identity, the ability to engage in non-manipulative relations, finding a
vocation in one's work, accepting one's death, developing the virtue of
hope, and a willingness to take up arms to defend one's way of life.
These are very suggestive elements, important for understanding who
persons are and how they relate to others, to society, and to nature.
The first quality that MacIntyre suggests, the ability to live with
uncertain ty, is a very critical virtue especially in light of the theory of
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evolution. It had previously been thought, and was a deep psychological consolation, that the orders of nature and society were stable and
normative. They were perceived to be rooted in an unchanging order
of the universe, established by its Creator. For better or worse, we
know that this is not the case, and one of the realities with which we
must make our peace is that our world is changing and will continue
to change. Therefore, the ability to live with a lack of certainty is a
highly desirable personal quality. MacIntyre very wisely, however,
roots the quality of being able to face an uncertain future in a sense of
identity that comes from a strong sense of the past, one's place in a
family, in a neighborhood, and in a community. Knowledge of self
and one's origins provides the strength needed to face an uncertain
future. Two other of the qualities that he mentions are very important. The first is the need to find meaning through one's work. There
is a twofold suggestion here. One is that we need to find meaning in
our lives, and one of the places where we can best find this is through
the vocation that we have in the world. The other suggestion is that
there are some things worth doing and it is important that they be
done regardless of their consequences. The second element of importance is the virtue of hope which is a belief in a reality that transcends
what is available as present evidence. The virtue of hope helps take us
beyond a purely rational orientation to reality and provides us with a
larger framework with which to both see and evaluate what we might
be about as we face our uncertain future.
Both of these orientations toward understanding the person suggest
important issues. Fletcher, in his own way, emphasizes the role of
rationality and planning in defining human qualities. In other writings,
he has suggested that the more something conforms to rationality, the
more human it becomes. For Fletcher, the use of genetic engineering,
screening programs, amniocentesis, and the like in insuring the birth of
a perfect child is more human because such processes make use of
rational planning techniques. On the other hand, MacIntyre looks at
broader qualities which appear to make persons more human . He
suggests, by implication, a stance toward nature which presupposes
the rational, but transcends it in a sense of both humility toward the
future as well as a sense of hope that one can remain in control of the
processes that will unfold before us. Both of these models have their
strengths and weaknesses. They both point to significant dimensions
of personal experience and the sense of the self, and they both suggest
a variety of relationships toward nature which will be important in
re-evaluating the two senses of responsibility toward the world
described immediately above. In some respects, both of these orientations are departures from the traditional model of the person found in
classical western philosophy and theology with its emphasis on a static
nature within a static world. But they are both important because
they suggest and allude to critical dimensions of the person which
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were not fully taken into account by that classical tradition. Thus,
they are extremely helpful in elucidating several qualities which it will
be necessary to cultivate as we begin to redefine our place within the
world.
Another element in the perception of self is the articulation of
one's relationship to one's descendants. This question, of course,
looms large on the horizon because of our growing perception and
experience of the scarcity of resources. It appears that we have already
left our descendants an environment which is damaged and a world
which has been depleted of many of its resources. This is not a very
positive statement about ourselves and even less of one about our concern for others.
Certainly our descendants, . whoever they may be, will have a
number of interests similar to ours. The problem is trying to define
the basis on which those interests should be respected, if at all.
Although utilitarian and contract models may not provide totally satisfactory resolutions of the problem, both suggest that one should at
least look toward the future when calculating total utility or when
trying to define how to act justly. Another approach would suggest
that we know that our descendants will need certain basic goods to
survive and that, therefore, they are entitled to these as a matter of
human rights. The orientation here focuses on not harming future generations, rather than promoting their well-being. Both of these
approaches might suggest that we should leave our descendants at least
as well off as we are, for in doing so we respect their interests and
leave them the resources necessary for an adequate quality of life.
My orientation toward this problem will also be affected by how I
see myself in relationship to other human beings. If, for example, I see
myself as a solitary individual with few links to my neighbors and my
community, then the whole question of responsibility to others has a
less significant place in my ethical considerations. If, however, I see
myself in a community which has come from other communities and
which is producing future communities, then it is more likely that I
will be concerned with the environment that I hand on to my
immediate descendants. These moral connections form the basis for
evaluating my actions in the light of my needs as well as those of my
descendants.
Another framework for analyzing this problem comes from one's
orientation toward the end of the world . If one adopts a more
apocalyptic viewpoint, then the question of future · generations
becomes somewhat less critical because when the end comes, it will
come quickly and reality will cease to have significance. The
apocalyptic orientation suggests that life may not be as teleological as
we would hope and that while all of us may have goals and aspirations
we wish to see fulfilled, ultimately the world ends and we end with it.
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On the other hand, if one has an eschatological viewpoint which sees
the future as the source of goals and values, then one can see oneself
as building toward a reality that will come to fruition in the absolute
future . In this framework it is important to build for one 's descendants a world which can be lived in and be a continuing source of hope.
If one views the future through the apocalyptic lens, the question of
the future is not that important because the end of the world is the
end of significance. In the eschatological framework, however, what
goes on within history and culture is important and relates to the
absolute future that will, eventually, be reached. In this framework,
the relationship to one's descendants is important and must be evaluated much more carefully.

3.

Biology and Behavior

A third important element is the relationship between our biological structure and our behavior. Such issues, although traditional in
their origins, have received a tremendous revival from the growing
perspective of sociobiology and the sophisticated knowledge we have
of genetics.
The concept of altruistic love, expressed as either giving one's life
for another or in being one 's brother's or sister's keeper, has formed
one of the major pillars of the western ethical tradition. One of the
suggestions of sociobiology is that perhaps such a high exercise of
altruism is not entirely voluntary and therefore not a moral act on the
part of an individual. Rather, such behavior may be programmed into
us by our genes, and our altruism is simply a mechanism of biological
survival rather than an important moral virtue. J. B. Haldane, a British
biologist, suggested the genetic structure of such altruistic behavior
when he proposed that he would lay down his life for two brothers or
eight cousins. The reason for that formulation was that it took that
many of each group to achieve a genetic identity to his which would
make his own sacrifice genetically acceptable, i.e., insured that the
same number of similar genes would remain in the gene pool. The
basic implication of such a posture is that one is altruistic towards
those who are genetically similar to me because even if I do not
benefit myself, I do aid those who have genes similar to mine.
Therefore, from a biological point of view, it makes no difference
whether I survive or they survive, because the same genes will survive
and be present in the gene pool to replicate themselves.
In the framework of E. O. Wilson, one of the contemporary
founders of sociobiology, egoistic behavior is behavior which guarantees that the genes will in fact cause copies of themselves to exist;
altruistic behavior is behavior which insures that copies of genes contained in an organism will survive, although they may be contained in
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another organism. These biological definitions of egoism and altruism
are then used interchangeably with the ethical concepts of selfish and
unselfish. The problem is that a direct translation appears to be rather
difficult. On the one hand, behaviors we experience as selfish or
unselfish are usually conscious and the result of an evaluation of consequences. A strategy for a genetic replication is typically unconscious
and therefore not under our control. Also the way the words egoism
and altruism are used refers primarily to actions which affect the gene
pool. One could infer that actions having no significant impact on the
gene pool must be neither egoistic or altruistic or, in value terms,
selfish or unselfish. That, however, does not correspond to our experience. Therefore, we must be aware of such an easy and uncritical
translation of biological categories into ethical categories. 21
Even though Wilson may not have the desired translation of genetic
terms into ethical terms, Arthur Caplan argues that there is a point at
which such verifications of biological behavior would be relevant to
ethical theory. He illustrates this by his discussion of psychological
egoism and ethical egoism. The theory of psychological egoism is a
factual theory about human motivation which claims that everyone
al ways tries to act in his or her best interest. If such a factual theory
were true, Caplan argues that the only reasonable basis for justified
ethical behavior would be a theory of ethical egoism which defines
morality as a matter of self interest. The only acceptable and meaningful ethical principle, therefore, is always to act to promote your own
individual good as much as possible. A significant part of the argument
for this position would be to determine that genes both actually cause
specific behaviors and that they are the sole causal agent for them. In
addition to the empiral data that a person would have to gather to
prove this position, one would also need to accept a great deal of
reductionistic theory which has its own theoretical problems. 22
Sociobiology also becomes involved in discussions of freedom and
moral responsibility, as has already been suggested in the discussion of
altruism. Part of the problem in this discussion involves the clarification of the concepts of freedom and determinism. If by freedom is
meant a radical freedom in which the person is bound by no constraints whatsoever, then it is clear that sociobiology as well as traditional philosophy and theology would be able to mount a strong case
against such a concept. On the other hand, if one accepts a more
modest theory of freedom in which choices are possible but only
within certain perimeters, then sociobiology may not be able to argue
as strongly against this as some of its proponents may suggest.
The discussion of freedom must also be related to a discussion of
determinism. Again, two extremes can be posed . Hard determinism
holds a theory of universal causation which argues that for every
effect and event there is a cause and that by definition freedom is
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incompatible with this perception of reality. From a sociobiological
viewpoint, this could mean that each of us is genetically determined
and, therefore, subject to irresistible compulsions and coercions and
must do what our biology tells us to do. Self-determinism would also
hold a theory of universal causation, but suggests that some causes
originate with human beings and that freedom is compatible with
determinism; this is a theory of self-determinism. From a biological
perspective, it could be argued that each of us has a set of predispositions within us which can cause us to move in some directions rather
than in others, but that no one specific action is totally determined.
A theory of hard determinism rules out a sense of both freedom
and moral responsibility. If one cannot control one's actions and if
one is simply acting in a preplanned manner, one cannot be responsible for one's actions. On the other hand, it does seem necessary to be
able to trace a certain chain of causality in one's actions so as to assign
responsibility for them . If one cannot argue back to a variety of
factors which caused one to act in a certain way, one could similarly
argue that the individual is not responsible. Human behavior cannot
simply be reduced to a set of biological coordinates. Such reductionism is contrary to our conscious experience and does not take into
account all of the behaviors which we attribute to free choice and for
which we assume people are morally accountable. In this perspective,
moral responsibility and freedom are argued for in terms of the causal
efficacy of human intentions and volitions in relationship to genetic
and environmental factors. Such a theory focuses on self-determination rather than genetic determination. It attempts to subsume into
itself a variety of data from different perspectives arguing, however,
that the self is the reality which is ultimately responsible for what is
done and assumes that responsibility can be justified on the basis of a
variety of causalities operating at different related levels .
The final topic in this section deals with the setting of social
policies based on some concept of justice or equality. Although a
variety of meanings may be read into these concepts, they have functioned as primary values in American society and as the basis upon
which many policy decisions have been made. For example, the belief
that all persons are created equal is the cornerstone of the American
way of life. Yet over the past several decades many allegations have
been made about genetic differences between people which would
seem to challenge these values. There are claims, for example, that
intelligence is related to one's racial group, or that aggressive behavior
is related to the presence of an extra Y chromosome. Such claims, it is
assumed, would make a significant difference with respect to the
social treatment of individuals within these populations.
It needs to be said immediately that a particular social policy does
not necessarily follow from a set of empirical facts, whatever they
may be. The fact that an individual may belong to a particular group
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which actually has less genetic potential with respect to a certain level
of achievement has no necessary relationship to the specific policy
that is directed to that group. Thus, for example, a policy could be
articulated which would argue that these individuals need more protection because they have less potential; on the other hand, a policy
could also be formulated which states that because these people have
less potential, they should simply be ignored.
What would be important, though, is that if it would be the case
that certain individuals have a particular genetic potential or lack of a
potential, that fact, when it is established as a fact, should be taken
into account in policy-making so that realistic policies and goals can
be set. This is simply saying that we should not try to do, much less
legislate or mandate, what we are not capable of doing, whether this
be biological or psychological. It is both inappropriate and unjust to
devise programs to help individuals reach potentials which they are
utterly incapable of achieving. On the other hand, the fact that they
might be incapable of reaching a certain potential does not mean that
they should be discriminated against, rejected by the society, or in
other ways ignored in terms of sharing in the basic goods of that
society. Facts need to be taken into account in setting policy, but
social and cultural values mediate those facts as they are incorporated
into policy, and genetics does not provide a totally adequate basis for
such a social evaluation.
Sociobiology and other research in genetics does suggest that there
may be problems ahead for those who have assumed that the concept
of equality of persons means equality in all respects. It is quite clear
that people are biologically different and therefore have a vast amount
of different potentials, and that the potential of each person is shaped
by his or her genetic background as well as the environment in which
he or she is raised. The fact that people are unequal with respect to
their potential does not mean that they are unequal with respect to
their moral value as individuals and as persons. Such an evaluation of
equality is independent of biological and environmental differences.
Sociobiology and other research in genetics could provide a useful
service by providing information about individuals who may have
limited potential so that unreasonable accomplishments would not be
expected from them. This could protect these individuals from having
unreasonable demands made of them and help eliminate some degree
of frustration from their lives. However, the determination of such d ifferences does not and should not jeopardize the unique moral value of
these individuals as persons.
IV.

Conclusion

Recent developments in genetics have provided an opportunity to
review and re-examine many traditional and thematic principles and
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concepts in ethics. I have included several of these topics and shown
how this new knowledge can help reformulate a concept or challenge a
traditional orientation. New discoveries in genetics as well as other
areas of the life sciences will continue, and new applications and
implications of that knowledge will occur. I hope that this presentation has provided a framework for examining these problems as well as
suggested some helpful directions in thinking about the resolution of
these new ethical dilemmas.
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